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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Christopher Jay Kimsey appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The district court set forth the relevant facts and proceedings in the underlying 
criminal case as follows: 
In case no. CRF-2008-1339, which underlies the current action, 
petitioner pled guilty to the felony of aggravated assault in violation of 
Idaho Code § 18-905. Petitioner appeared for sentencing on January 14, 
2009 and sentence was imposed in open court. A Judgment and Sentence 
was entered, filed, and sent to petitioner's attorney on that same date. The 
court sentenced petitioner to two years fixed imprisonment, with four 
years indeterminate, for a total of six years, with 362 days credit for time 
served. The court reserved judgment for the filing of a memorandum of 
restitution. 
(R., pp.14-15.) Kimsey did not appeal from the judgment of conviction. (R., p.15.) 
Kimsey filed his prose petition for post-conviction relief and supporting affidavit 
on August 15, 2011 (R., pp.1-7), raising the following three claims: (1) "Convicts and 
insanity acquitees"; (2) "Errors or irregularities and prejudice"; and (3) "Representation 
by counsel" (R., p.2). The district court filed its Notice of Intention to Dismiss, 
explaining that Kimsey's petition was untimely under LC. § 19-4902 and, alternatively, 
"based upon the pleadings filed by petitioner, there is no genuine issue of material fact 
that would entitle him to relief if resolved in his favor." (R., pp.14-18.) In responding to 
the court's Notice of Intention to Dismiss, Kimsey filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment 
(R., pp.24-34) not only conceding his petition was untimely (R., p.31), but 
acknowledging he was "acting pro se and will continue to do so" (R., p.29) 
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(capitalization modified). After construing Kimsey's pleading as a response to its Notice 
of Intention (R., p.35), the district court dismissed his post-conviction petition because it 
was untimely and he had not established any basis for equitable tolling (R., pp.35-37). 
Judgment was filed November 11, 2011 (R., pp.38-39), and Kimsey's Notice of Appeal 
was timely filed on November 17, 2011 (R., pp.43-46). 
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ISSUE 
Kimsey's brief does not contain a statement of issues on appeal as required by 
I.A.R. 35(a)(4). The state phrases the issue as follows: 
The district court dismissed Kimsey's post-conviction petition because it was 
untimely. Because he has failed to challenge the basis for the district court's decision, 
must the decision of the district court be affirmed? 
Alternatively, 
Did the district court correctly determine Kimsey's post-conviction petition was 




The District Court's Order Must Be Affirmed Because Kimsey Has Not Challenged The 
Court's Determination That The Petition Was Untimely 
When the basis for the district court's ruling is not challenged on appeal, the 
appellate court will affirm on the unchallenged basis. State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 
366, 956 P.2d 1311 (Ct. App. 1998). Kimsey has made absolutely no effort to challenge 
the district court's conclusion that his post-conviction petition was untimely or that he 
had failed to establish any basis for equitable tolling. 
Presumably, Kimsey has not challenged the district court's ruling because he 
conceded the petition was untimely before the district court. In his Motion to Vacate 
Judgment, Kimsey asserted his habeas corpus1 should be reviewed "on the grounds of 
improper exhaustion, due to the fact that I missed the filing deadlines established under 
guidelines for appeals in the state courts ... and for the notice of appeal/post conviction." 
(R., p.31) ( capitalization altered). Kimsey further conceded, "You may ask why I have 
waited this long to file for post-conviction relief, and the answer is that it was not 
available until last year, which, by definition of the court's guidelines, is to [sic] late to 
file." (R., p.31) ( capitalization altered) Finally, in expressly addressing the district 
court's Notice oflntention to Dismiss, Kimsey averred, "The fact is I am already to [sic] 
late by the standards set for state courts." (R, p.32) ( capitalization altered). 
Because Kimsey has not challenged the district court's underlying basis for 
dismissing his post-conviction petition, the court's decision must be affirmed. 
1 Although not part of the underlying record, Kimsey has also filed a federal Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus that remains pending before the federal district court. 
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II. 
Kimsey Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred By Dismissing Kimsey's 
Petition Because It Was Untimely 
A. Introduction 
Even if this Court does not affirm solely on the basis that Kimsey has failed to 
challenge the only basis for the district court's dismissal of his post-conviction petition, 
the order of summary dismissal must nevertheless be affirmed because he has failed to 
establish his petition was timely or that he was entitled to equitable tolling. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The applicability of a statute of limitation is a question of law subject to free 
review on appeal. State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245, 796 P.2d 121 (1990); State v. 
Ochieng, 147 Idaho 621, 624, 213 P.3d 406 (Ct. App. 2009) ("[R]eview of the district 
court's construction and application of the limitation statute is a matter of free review."). 
C. The District Court Correctly Determined Kimsey's Petition Was Untimely 
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) permits the filing of a post-conviction petition "any time 
within one ( 1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination 
of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is 
later." Absent a showing by the petitioner that the limitation period should be tolled, the 
failure to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for summary dismissal 
of the petition. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066 (2009); Evensiosky 
v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190-91, 30 P.3d 967 (2001); Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 959, 
88 P.3d 776 (Ct. App. 2003). Because Kimsey did not file a notice of appeal, the 
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judgment became final on February 25, 2009, forty-two days after the district court 
entered its Judgment and Sentence on January 14, 2009. See I.A.R. 14. 
Therefore, for Kimsey's post-conviction petition to be timely, it had to be filed no 
later than February 25, 2010, one year after the expiration of his time to appeal the 
judgment. I.C. § 19-4902(a). However, Kimsey did not file his pro se petition until 
August 15, 2011, nearly eighteen months after the expiration of the limitation period 
under I.C. § 19-4902(a). Moreover, as detailed above, Kimsey repeatedly conceded 
before the district court that his petition was untimely. (R., pp.31-32.) 
Because Kimsey's post-conviction petition was untimely, it was properly 
dismissed by the district court. 
D. The District Court Correctly Determined Kimsey Failed To Establish Any Basis 
For Equitable Tolling 
As explained in Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 386, 256 P.3d 791 (Ct. App. 
2011) (citing Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 251, 220 P.3d 1066 (2009)), Idaho has 
recognized equitable tolling in very limited situations, including, "where the petitioner 
was incarcerated in an out-of-state facility without legal representation or access to Idaho 
legal materials and where mental disease and/or psychotropic medication prevented the 
petitioner from timely pursuing challenges to the conviction." Tolling is also permitted 
where there are "'claims which simply are not known to the defendant within the time 
limit, yet raise important due process issues."' Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250 ( quoting 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870 (2007)). However, equitable 
tolling involves a "stringent standard," and"[t]olling is not allowed for a petitioner's own 
inaction." Schultz, 151 Idaho at 386. Finally, it is the "burden of the party asserting 
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equitable tolling to show that such tolling is warranted and to submit evidence tending to 
show that his claim was valid." Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 49, 232 P.3d 813 (2010) 
(Kidwell, J. Pro Tern, concurring) (citing Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905); Rhoades, 148 
Idaho at 249 ( explaining one of the issues was "whether Rhoades has met his burden of 
pleading facts that would entitle him to that equitable tolling"). 
In his Motion to Vacate Judgment, Kimsey contended, "Opportunity to meet the 
requirements of equitable tolling 'doctrine' were [sic] impossible due to bias of counsel 
and emphasis by medical/mental health to medicate rather than examine the legal aspects 
for their legitimacy." (R., p.25) (capitalization altered). The district court recognized 
Kimsey "fail[ ed] to explain the nature of the bias or how the bias caused the delay in 
filing the petition." (R., p.36.) The court's conclusion is correct because Kimsey's 
conclusory statement was unsupported by any facts or admissible evidence. Moreover, to 
the extent Kimsey was contending ineffective assistance of counsel provided a basis for 
equitable tolling, ineffective assistance of counsel has not been recognized as a viable 
bias to equitably toll the statute of limitation. Stuart, 149 Idaho at 48 ("this Court [has] 
suggested that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel would not qualify for equitable 
tolling under the UPCPA"). 
Liberally reviewing Kimsey's pro se Motion to Vacate Judgment, the district 
court also examined instances where he noted medical and mental health issues. (R., 
p.36.) However, the court properly recognized Kimsey never contended "any medication 
or instability left him incompetent and prevented him from earlier pursuing challenges to 
his conviction." (R., p.36.) This is particularly true because Kimsey's references to 
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medical and mental health issues were also conclusory and unsupported by any 
admissible evidence. 
Because Kimsey's post-conviction petition is untimely and he has failed to meet 
his burden of establishing any basis for equitable tolling, the district court's order 
summarily dismissing his untimely post-conviction petition must be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's Order 
Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
DATED this 18th day of January, 2013. 
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L. LaMONT ANDERSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on or about the 18th day of January, 2013, I caused to 
be serviced a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated 
below, postage prepaid where applicable, and addressed to the following: 
Christopher Jay Kimsey, #91057 
IMSI 
P.O. Box 51 
Boise, ID 83707 
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